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NOTE
THE EROSION OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW:
ANTICIPATORY DELEGATION IN AMERICAN ELECTRIC
POWER COMPANYV. CONNECTICUT

Paul Winters*
Eleven plaintiffs brought a common law action, seeking injunctive
relief against the six largest American producers of greenhouse gases.
Because the EPA had not yet promulgated regulations governing the
production of greenhouse gases, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held that federal law had not displaced plaintiffs ' common law claim.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that even though regulations had
not been promulgated, EPA occupied the field nevertheless. The decision
marks an extension ofthe regulatory displacement offederal common law
to regulations that are merely anticipated Such extension, or "anticipatory
delegation, " represents an unacceptably large incursion into the scope
offederal common law. Anticipatory delegation suffers from at least two
problems. First, it leaves plaintiffs with cognizable claims the prospect of
no redress. Second, the lack ofpractical redressability creates paradoxical
problems related to standing.

* Attorney at Law, Mosher and Wagenmaker, Chicago. DePaul University Col
lege of Law (20 12). The author wishes thank Leia Schmidt and Arthur Martora
na of the Buffalo Environmental Law Journal for their valuable input and expert
editing. Professor Stephen Siegel of the DePaul College of Law provided crucial
insight in framing the questions addressed herein. Also a word of appreciation
to Christopher Newcomb, Refinery and Environmental Attorney, who helped me
think through some of the larger issues related to greenhouse gases. Finally, I
would like to express my deep gratitude to my wife Sue, for her unfailing encour
agement throughout law school and during the writing of this Note.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2004, eight states, two conservation groups, and the City
of New York brought suit in federal court against six defendants in
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut. 1 The plaintiffs alleged
the defendants to be the largest producers of carbon dioxide in the
United States and among the largest producers on the planet. 2 The
complaint states the defendants account for ten percent of carbon
dioxide emissions from all human activity in the United States. 3
Plaintiffs brought their case under a theory of federal common law
nuisance, and in the alternative, state public nuisance law. The relief
sought was an injunction in the form of a carbon dioxide emissions
cap on the defendants for at least ten years. 4
Seven years later the Supreme Court held that the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") enforced the Clean Air
Act, and, through its final rules and anticipated proposed rules,
displaced plaintiffs' federal common law right to seek abatement of
pollution by the defendants. 5 The Court pointed out that greenhouse
'131 S.Ct. 2527 (2011).
See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) vacated and remanded, 582 F. 3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009) rev'd, 131 S. Ct.
2527 (U.S. 2011); Complaint, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power. Co., Inc., 2004
WL 5614397 (S.D.N.Y.) (No. l04CV05669); Complaint, Open Space Inst. v.
Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 2004 WL 5614409 (S.D.N.Y.) (No. 104CV05670).
The eight states included: New York, Connecticut, California, Iowa, New Jersey,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. The conservation groups included: Open
Space Institute Inc.; Open Space Conservancy, Inc.; andAudubon Society ofNew
Hampshire.
3 Id The six defendants included the Tennessee Valley Authority and five com
mercial defendants: American Electric Power Company, Inc., Service Corpora
tion, The Southern Company, Tennessee Valley Authority, Xcel Energy Inc., and
Cinergy Corporation.
4 Id at 268; see Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming As A Public Nuisance, 30
CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293, 306 (2005). Merrill explains that the complaint could
have been brought under federal common law, or state common law, but not both.
Id "Federal common law is in effect a type of preemption of state law. When a
court holds that a matter is governed by federal common law, state law is auto
matically preempted, and a federal rule of decision applies instead." Id at 307.
5 Am. Elec. Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2538 (discussing rulemaking under the Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411).
2
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gases, as defined in Massachusetts v. EPA, 6 were "air pollutants"
under the Clean Air Act, and subject to regulation by the EPA. 7 The
displacement holding in American Power was not novel; the Court
has previously held in City ofMilwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan,
that once Congress exercises its power to regulate in an area, the
ensuing statutory or regulatory authority displaces federal common
law. 8 American Electric, however, expanded displacement doctrine
by introducing the concept of anticipatory delegation. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals noted that at the time of its decision,
greenhouse gases were not yet regulated under the Clean Air Act. 9
On this basis, the Second Circuit held that federal law had not been
displaced, since any proposed rules or findings by the EPA would
have no legal effect on the matter before the court. 10 The Supreme
Court reversed this holding. 11 Though the EPA had not yet begun
to regulate greenhouse gases, the Court held that they were within
the purview of the EPA. 12 The EPA had been delegated the decision
about whether or not to regulate greenhouse gases. 13 Accordingly,
the Court reasoned that EPA regulatory authority was the only
appropriate channel through which harm resulting from greenhouse
gases could be redressed. 14
Extending regulatory displacement of federal common
law to regulations that are merely anticipated represents an
unacceptably large incursion into the scope of federal common
549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
Am. Elec. Power, 131 S.Ct. at2533.
8 City ofMilwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304,314 (1981).
9 Connecticutv. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309,380 (2d Cir. 2009) rev'd,
131 S. Ct. 2527 (U.S. 2011).
10 Id. at 379-80. "Until EPA completes the rulemaking process, we cannot specu
late as to whether the hypothetical regulation of greenhouse gases under the Clean
Air Act would in fact "speak[] directly" to the "particular issue" raised here by
Plaintiffs, which is otherwise governed by federal common law." Id. at 380 (rely
ing on the rule for displacement as articulated in Oneida County, NY. v. Oneida
Indian Nation ofNew York State, 470 U.S. 226 (1985)).
11 Am. Elec. Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2538.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 I d.
6

7
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law. 15 The Court's curtailment, through anticipatory delegation in
American Power, leaves vacant a hole that the federal common law
once ably filled. This article will proceed as follows: Part I briefly
traces some historical contours of federal common law from Erie
v. Tompkins forward to American Electric. A brief summary of the
issue of standing and how Massachusetts v. EPA shaped standing
in American Electric will also be reviewed. Part II will show how
the American Electric Court's use of anticipatory delegation suffers
from two defects. First, the Court's decision leaves plaintiffs with
cognizable claims the prospect of no redress. Because the court was
willing to make injured parties wait for potential future regulations
as a means of relief, parties suffering harm now face the prospect
of unacceptably delayed relief, if that relief comes at all. Second,
the Court in American Electric did not deal adequately with its
decision's impact on the related issue of standing. The lack of
practical redressability creates paradoxical problems for justices on
both sides of the standing question.

I. BACKGROUND: HISTORICAL CONTOURS OF
FEDERAL COMMON LAW AND THE BACKDROP OF
STANDING
A. From Erie Railroad Co. to Milwaukee I: Federal Common
Law and Pollution Abatement

The Court's famous declaration in Erie v. Tompkins that
"[t]here is no federal general common law" has governed federal
adjudications since Justice Brandeis' pronouncement some seventy
three years ago. 16 The Erie Court mandated that, except for those
15 Jay Tidmarsh and Brian J. Murray provide a working definition of federal com
mon law as follows: "The intermediate definition is the modem standard: 'Federal
common law' means 'federal rules of decision whose content cannot be traced by
traditional methods of interpretation to federal statutory or constitutional com
mands.' See Jay Tidmarsh and Brian J. Murray, A Theory Of Federal Common
Law, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 585, 590 (2006) (citing RicHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL.,
HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL CoURTs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 685 (5th ed.
2003)).
16 Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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matters governed by the Constitution or by acts of Congress, federal
courts shall apply the substantive law of the states in which they
sit. 17 Yet since the very year in which Erie was decided, the Supreme
Court has carved out exceptions to the general rule in order to
provide for certain expressions of federal common law. 18 Indeed, on
the same day the decision in Erie was announced, the Court held in
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co. that its rule
governing a state boundary dispute was federal common law. 19
To resolve these seemingly conflicting signals since Erie, the
Supreme Court has specified the areas in which federal common
law may be said to govern. 20 Specifically, the Court has stated that
federal common law exists particularly in areas ofnational concern. 21
As the Court stated in American Electric, the federal common law
encompasses those areas identified by Congress or as required by
the Constitution. 22
Until recently, interstate pollution abatement suits brought on
the theory of interstate nuisance had been one sphere controlled by

17Jd
18 See Martha A. Field, Sources Of Law: The Scope Of Federal Common Law, 99
HARv. L. REv. 881, 885 ( 1986)(concluding that the mixed message from Supreme
Court that year obfuscated the boundaries of the federal common law from day
one).
19 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts And The Making Of Federal Common
Law, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 825, 826 (2005) (citing Hinderlider v. La Plata River &
Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938)).
20 But see Field, supra note 18, at 885. Field argues that the traditional view that
the federal law governs only discrete, specified domains is based on a misread
ing of Erie. Id at 888. Erie, according to Field, was not so much about delimited
federal common law, as it was about establishing positively our conception of
what state law is. Id Accordingly, Field posits that the scope of federal common
law should be much broader, limited only in that, "[a federal] court must point to
a federal enactment, constitutional or statutory, that it interprets as authorizing the
federal common law rule." Id at 887.
21 See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise ofErie- And ofthe New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 405 (1964). Friendly predicted that limiting the domain of
federal common law would actually useful uniformity and predictability, because
Erie enabled the federal courts to specialize.
22 Am. Elec. Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2535.
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federal common law. 23 Thomas Merrill has argued that since 1901,
long before Erie, the Supreme Court effectively applied federal
common law in several pollution abatement suits between states. 24
In each case, the Court deemed that it would be inappropriate to
apply the common laws of the party states. 25 Consequently, the
Court "drew on the general law of nuisance without referring to the
laws of either state."26 Indeed, in one of these early cases, Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., the court adopted language, echoed over sixty
years later in Illinois v. City ofMilwaukee 27 (Milwaukee I) when that
Court decided to abate a state's water pollution emissions through
federal common law. 28 Thus, leading up the formal recognition
of the federal common law of nuisance as a pollution abatement
mechanism, there was a de facto observance of it in Supreme Court
jurisprudence.29
B. Milwaukee I and II- Regulatory Displacement of Federal
Common Law

In 1972, the State ofillinois brought an action against the City
of Milwaukee, alleging that the city, its sewage commission, and the
See Julia A. Davis, The Hazardous Waste Regulatory Programs And The Fed
eral Common Law OfNuisance: A Confusion Between Preemption And Codifica
tion, 45 OHio ST. L.J. 791 (1984).
24 See Merrill, supra note 4 at 307-08. The cases Merrill identifies are: Missouri
v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230,
236-38 (1907);New Yorkv. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (l92l);NewJerseyv. City
ofNew York, 283 U.S. 473,476-77 (1931).
2s Id
26 Id
27 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
28 See Davis, supra note 23 at 791. As cited by Davis, the Georgia v. Tennessee
Court stated, "[i]t is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that
the air over its territory should not be polluted on a great scale by sulphurous
acid gas, that the forests on its mountains ... should not be further destroyed or
threatened by the act of persons beyond its control..." 206 U.S. 230,238 (1907).
29 See Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Preemption And Private Legal Remedies
For Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 121, 152 (claiming that early federal common
nuisance law jurisprudence was rooted in the interests of federalism, as well the
preservation of natural resources under state quasi-sovereignty).
23
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County's Metropolitan Sewage Commission were polluting Lake
Michigan through the release ofuntreated sewage. 30 In Illinois v. City
ofMilwaukee, Wis., (Milwaukee 1), the Supreme Court recognized
a public nuisance cause of action under federal common law. 31 But
the court did not exercise original jurisdiction in the case, holding
that the district court was the appropriate forum for resolution. 32 The
State ofIllinois again sued the defendants, this time in federal district
court (Milwaukee II), seeking abatement according to the federal
common law doctrine of public nuisance. 33 Five months after the
suit was filed, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972 (FWPCA), which gave the EPA authority
to regulate effluent emissions. 34 "The Amendments established a
new system of regulation under which it is illegal for anyone to
discharge pollutants into the Nation's waters except pursuant to a
permit."35 The District Court found that the statute had not displaced
the federal common law of public nuisance. 36 The Seventh Circuit
affirmed in part and reversed in part. 37 The court held that while
FWPCA had not displaced federal common public nuisance law, the
District Court had wrongly imposed limitations more stringent than
those required by applicable permits and EPA regulations. 38
The Supreme Court vacated the Seventh Circuit's decision
and remanded the case. 39 The Court held that although federal
common law exists in areas of national concern, once Congress
exercises its power to regulate such an area, statutory or regulatory
authority displaces federal common law. 40 The Court explained,
Illinois v. City ofMilwaukee, Wis., 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972).
See Davis, supra note 23 at 796 (stating that the court's justification for its use
of federal common law stemmed from Congressional commitment to preserving
national waterways).
32 Id at 108.
33 City ofMilwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
34 /d at310.
35 Id at 310-11.
36 Id at 311.
37 Id at 312.
38 Id
39 Id at 332.
40 Id at 314. See Merrill, supra note 4 at 314 (noting that underlying the displace30
31
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"[f]ederal common law is subject to the paramount authority of
Congress."41 The Court reasoned that Congress and agencies of the
federal government, not the courts, were best positioned to handle
the complex issues related to matters like environment protection. 42
The Court noted that with the passage of the FWPCA,
Congress "ha[d] occupied the field through the establishment
of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert
administrative agency."43 Moreover, the problem of effluent
limitations at the sites in question had been thoroughly addressed by
FWPCA. 44 The Court reasoned, therefore, that FWPCA displaced
the federal common law of public nuisance. The State oflllinois did
not avail itself of the statutory protections already existing under the
act. 45 Accordingly, no federal common law remedy was available to
Illinois. 46
C. American Electric -Anticipatory Displacement

In 2004, eight states and three non-profit land trusts filed suit
in federal court against five private companies and the Tennessee
Valley Authority ("TVA")Y "According to the complaint, the
defendants were the five largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the
United States."48 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' carbon
dioxide production put the plaintiffs' lands at risk, and endangered
wildlife as well as ecosystems. 49 The plaintiffs, therefore, sought
injunctive relief under the federal common law theory of interstate
nuisance. 50 Relief sought by the plaintiffs would require the
ment of federal common law by legislation or regulatory rules is an important sep
aration of powers question, "namely, whether the Article III courts are permitted
to establish rules of decision in a particular area when Congress has not acted").
41 /d at313-14.
42 Id
43 Id at 317.
44 /d at 320.
45 Id at 326.
46 Id at 332.
47 Am. Elec. Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2534.
48 Id
49 Id
so Id
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defendants to cap carbon dioxide production and then annually
reduce levels of production by a certain percentage for ten years. 51
The District Court dismissed the suit on grounds that plaintiffs
raised a political question. 52 The Second Circuit reversed the District
Court, holding that there was no political question, and that the
plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged Article III standing. 53 Additionally,
the Second Circuit held on the merits that plaintiffs' had successfully
stated a claim on the federal common law theory of nuisance, and
that the Clean Air Act did not displace the federal common law on
this matter. 54 Crucial to the Second Circuit's decision was the fact
that the EPA had not yet promulgated regulations controlling the
production of carbon dioxide. 55
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and held
that the Clean Air Act displaced the federal common law with
respect to the production of greenhouse gases. 56 On the question of
standing, the Court split four-four, thereby affirming the decision
Id
Connecticut v. American Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F.Supp.2d 265, 274
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (explaining that, "[b]ecause resolution of the issues presented
here requires identification and balancing of economic, environmental, foreign
policy, and national security interests, 'an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion' is required").
53 Id
54 /d at 270.
55 Am. Elec. Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2535. Note that at the time ofthe Second Circuit's
decision, in order to regulate GHGs from motor vehicles, the EPA was required
to have made findings that GHGs "cause or contribute to air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." Conn. v. Am.
Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 379 (2nd Cir. 2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)
(l)(A)). Additionally, because stationary sources were under review, the EPA was
required to have found that ambient air results from diverse, multiple mobile and
stationary sources. Id The EPA made no such findings. Id The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals noted that even were the EPA to publish findings, these would
have no legislative effect, but would require that proposed and final rules be pro
mulgated before the EPA could actually regulate GHGs. Id at 380. As the court
stated, "[u]ntil EPA completes the rulemaking process, we cannot speculate as to
whether the hypothetical regulation of greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act
would in fact "speak[ ] directly" to the "particular issue" raised here by Plaintiffs,
which is otherwise governed by federal common law." Id
56 Am. Elec. Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2540.
51

52
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of the Second Circuit. 57 The Court affirmed, as the Court did in
Milwaukee I and Milwaukee II that "it is primarily the office of
Congress, not the federal courts, to prescribe national policy in areas
of special federal interest." 58 Though the Second Circuit held, and
the plaintiffs argued, that displacement of federal common law was
improper because the EPA had yet to promulgate regulations for
carbon dioxide emissions, the Supreme Court held the Clean Air
Act had displaced the federal common law of interstate nuisance. 59
Recalling its decision in Milwaukee II the Court stated that "the
relevant question for purposes of displacement is 'whether the field
has been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a particular
manner. "'60 The absence of a regulation concerning some specific
emission did not validate federal common law. 61 The delegation
itself, not any specific implementation, is what displaces federal
common law. 62
D. Massachusetts v. EPA: The Standing Precursor to American
Electric

The Supreme Court split four-four on the question ofstanding
in American Electric. The divided justices fell on either side of the
standing debate that had arisen four years earlier in Massachusetts
v. EPA. Because the issues of standing and anticipatory delegation in
American Electric are interrelated, the following is a brief review of
that doctrine, and its background in Massachusetts.

Id at 2535. One side of the division aligned itself with the majority in Massa
chusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), which held that a state had Article III stand
ing to bring a suit against the EPA for failure to regulate pollutants. The other side
of the division aligned itself with the dissent opinion in the same case.
58 Id at 2537; see Merrill, supra note 4 (predicting and agreeing with the Court's
decision in American Power arguing that Congress, not the courts, is best equipped
to deal with "significant multijurisdictional air pollution problems.").
59 Am. Elec. Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2540.
60 Id at 2539 (citing City ofMilwaukee, 451 U.S. at 324).
61 Id at 2538.
62 Id
57
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1. Standing in General

Standing has been labeled the "Rorschach test of federal
courts."63 It is a threshold question in cases before the Supreme
Court. 64 As the Court wrote in Warth v. Seldin, "[i]n its constitutional
dimension, standing imports justiciability: whether the plaintiff has
made out a 'case or controversy' between himself and the defendant
within the meaning ofArt. III. " 65 In order to establish standing under
the traditional model, a plaintiff must first allege that he or she has
suffered an injury fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant. 66
The injury must be a "concrete and particularized injury that is either
actual or imminent."67 The plaintiff must also show that the harm
suffered is likely to be redressed by the requested relief. 68
The Court has been careful to note that generalized grievances,
including some environmental complaints, must occasionally be
precluded for a lack of sta'nding. 69 As the Court stated in Lujan v.
Defenders ofWildlife:
We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only
a generally available grievance about government claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest
in proper application of the Constitution and laws,
and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly
benefits him than it does the public at large - does
not state an Article III case or controversy. 70
See Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent The Standing
Doctrine? An Empirical Study Of The Evolution Of Standing, 1921-2006, 62
STAN. L. REv. 591, 594 (2010) (noting that "standing remains one of the most
contested areas of federal law, with criticisms of the doctrine nearing the number
of commentators").
64 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
6s Id
66 Allen v. Wright, 468 US. 737, 751 (1984).
67 Lujan v. Defenders ofWildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560--61 (1992).
68 Id
69 See Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than Ordi
nary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA :S New Standing Test For States, 49 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1701, 1710-1711 (2008)(noting that the Supreme Court has stated
that such generalized injuries are often best remedied through the actions of the
political branches instead of the judiciary).
70 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573.
63
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The Court's concern with generalized grievances has been
"to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no
individual rights would be vindicated ... " 71 Until 1998, what type
of generalized grievances would constitute sufficient grounds
to establish standing was unclear. 72 But in the 1998 case Federal
Election Commission v. Akins, the Court provided some guidance. 73
The Akins Court stated that where injuries are "widely shared" or
"of an abstract and indefinite nature," it would deny standing. 74 On
the other hand, the Court stated that when an injury was "sufficiently
concrete and specific," that injury may qualify a plaintiff for Article
III standing, even if it is "widely shared."75
2. Standing in Massachusetts v. EPA and its progeny:
American Electric
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court relied on Akins
in its determination of whether the plaintiffs had standing. 76 In
Massachusetts, twelve states and a variety of cities and conservation
groups argued that the EPA must regulate greenhouse gases pursuant
to section§ 202(a)(1) ofthe Clean Air Act. 77 The EPA challenged the
suit on the ground that Massachusetts lacked standing. 78 Specifically,
the EPA argued that "because greenhouse gas emissions inflict
widespread harm, the doctrine ofstanding present[ed] an insuperable
jurisdictional obstacle" to the plaintiffs' complaint.79

Gladstone Realtors v. Village ofBellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979).
See Bradford, supra note 69, at 1712.
73 Fed Election Com 'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998). See Bradford, supra note 69,
at 1714 (commenting that the Akins decision, though providing some clarification,
did not "settle all questions about when plaintiffs alleging generalized grievances
are entitled to standing").
74 Akins, 524 U.S. at 34.
75 Id at 24.
76 Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. at 522.
77 Id at 505.
78 /d at517.
79 Id
71

72
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In a five to four split, the Court disagreed. 8°Citing the Akins
decision, the Massachusetts Court held that even though the climate
change risks alleged by the state of Massachusetts were widely held,
that did not "minimize Massachusetts' interest in the outcome of
[the] litigation." 81 Moreover, the State of Massachusetts, like other
states, was not a normal litigant for standing determinations. 82 Going
back to Georgia v. Tennessee Copper, the Court noted that a state's
interest in the air and earth within its domain warranted federal
jurisdiction. 83 Unlike a private individual, Massachusetts' status as a
quasi-sovereign state entitled it to "special solicitude" for purposes
of determining standing. 84
The dissent in Massachusetts accused the majority of
not playing by the rules, but instead changing them midstream. 85
Chief Justice Roberts asserted that the relaxing of standing
requirements where states are concerned was not based in the
Court's jurisprudence. 86 Indeed, wrote Roberts, the Court's creation
of "special solicitude" was nothing but an implicit concession that
Massachusetts did not have standing according to the traditional
rule. 87
80 Id Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Roberts, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Roberts, C.J., and Thomas andAlito, JJ., joined. Id at 501.
81 Id at 522.
82 /d at518.
83 /d at518-19.
84 Id at 520. But see Mank, supra note 69, at 1746 (noting that the Court's deci
sion did not sketch out the parameters of "special solicitude" with regard to its
standing determination. Indeed, Mank writes, "[t]he Court was ambiguous about
whether Massachusetts satisfied normal standing requirements or met those re
quirements only because it was a state").
85 Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. at 536.
86 Id
87 Id at 540. This the Chief Justice took to be both boon and bane: "The good
news is that the Court's 'special solicitude' for Massachusetts limits the future
applicability of the diluted standing requirements applied in this case. The bad
news is that the Court's self-professed relaxation of those Article III requirements
has caused us to transgress 'the proper- and properly limited- role of the courts
in a democratic society."' Id at 548 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750
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Both the arguments of majority and the dissent in
Massachusetts found purchase four years later in American
Electric. The Court in American Electric divided on the question of
standing, each side reflecting the division in Massachusetts v. EPA. 88
The four-four split affirmed the Second Circuit's holding that the
Plaintiffs had standing. 89 With the standing question out of the way,
the Court proceeded to consider whether federal common law had
been displaced. 90

II. DEFECTS OF ANTICIPATORY DELEGATION
The Supreme Court's decision in American Electric suffers
from at least two defects.
First, it leaves plaintiffs who have suffered injury no
avenue of redress if the injury arises out of an area of oversight
already delegated to the EPA but not yet formally regulated. The
problem is a practical one. The contribution of greenhouse gasses
to global warming is extremely complex. Such complexities add
to the problem of limited EPA resources that make expedient
and comprehensive regulation difficult. This logjam results in an
effective lack of redressibility.
Second, this lack of practical redressability undermines the
Supreme Court's holding that the Plaintiffs had standing to bring the
suit. Anticipatory delegation raises certain paradoxical implications
related to the Court's split on standing. Those implications make
anticipatory delegation problematic.
A. Practical Lack of Redressability

"The redressability requirement asks whether the relief
sought by the plaintiffs is likely to cure the injury of which they
complain. " 91 In American Electric, the relief sought by the plaintiffs
(1984)).
88 Am. Elec. Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2535.
89 Id
9o Id
91 See Merrill, supra note 3 at 298.
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was a judicially imposed curb on emissions, which would grow
progressively over time. 92 The Supreme Court refused the relief
sought by the plaintiffs because the Court deemed EPA regulation
of the field a sufficient avenue of relief for the plaintiffs. 93 Part of
that regulatory scheme was rulemaking by the EPA according to
§ 7411 ofthe Clean Air Act. 94 In denying plaintiff's requested relief
in American Electric, the Court noted that the EPA had agreed to
complete its§ 7411 rule making no later than May 2012. 95
Under the provisions ofRule § 7411, the EPA's Administrator
first publishes proposed regulations establishing standards for
stationary emission sources. 96 After publication, the EPA receives
comments from interested persons on the proposed regulations. 97
Within one year of publication of the proposed regulations, the
Administrator must promulgate final regulations, including such
amendments as the Administrator deems appropriate. 98 In reversing
the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court explained that this process
provided an avenue for the relief sought by the plaintiffs. 99 The Court
reasoned that there was therefore "no need for a parallel track." 100
The redress of civil harms is foundational. "The very essence
of civil liberty certainly consists of the right of every individual to
claim the protection ofthe laws, whenever he receives an injury. One
of the first duties of government is to afford that protection." 101 The
Supreme Court has recognized that this duty extends to occasions
when one state or its citizens through its polluting activities, harm
Am. Elec. Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2534.
Id at 2538.
94 Id at 2537.
92
93

9s Id

42 U.S.C.A. § 74ll(b)(l)(B) (2011). Categories of stationary emission sources
are also defined and established by the EPA Administrator. Sources are so defined
if, in the Administrator's judgment, the source "causes, or contributes significant
ly to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 74ll(b)(l)(A).
97 42 U.S.C. § 74ll(b)(l)(B).
98 Id
99 Am. Elec. Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2538.
1oo Id
101 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803).
96

358 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19

another state or its citizens. 102 However, the form ofrelief anticipated
by the Court in American Electric, because it is speculative, fails to
fulfill the duty of the federal government to ensure the redress to
which the plaintiffs are due.
1. The EPA's Spotty Track Record in Publication

The Supreme Court's faith in anticipated relief through
the EPA is overly-optimistic, given the EPA's spotty track record
in publishing legislatively mandated rules. Relief for the American
Electric plaintiffs, through EPA channels, will likely be impeded by
the EPA's failure to publish, delays in correcting EPA omissions, and
the peculiar complexities of greenhouse gas effects, with which the
EPA has struggled.
Even though Congress has mandated that the EPA promulgate
regulations in the areas over which the agency has been delegated
authority, those promulgations have often been significantly delayed
or omitted. For example, in National Resources Defense Council v.
United States EPA., the plaintiff sued the EPA for failure to promulgate
regulations as required by the Clean Water Act, as amended in 33
U.S.C. § 1314(m) . 103 The amendments required the EPA to publish
effluent limitation guidelines, and new source performance standards
for storm water discharges in the construction industry. 104 Two years
after the amendment the EPA had not published the rules. 105 Plaintiffs
moved for summary judgment compelling the EPA to publish,
arguing that the Act imposed on the EPA a "nondiscretionary duty"

102 See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237 (declaring "the state
has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth
and air within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall
be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air"); see also,
Glicksman, supra note 29, at 153 (Asserting that federal protection guards against
the kind of encroachment that "threatens the integrity ofthe invaded state's sover
eignty, and thereby threatens individual liberty by diminishing the capacity of the
invaded state's citizens for self-determination").
103 437 F.Supp.2d 1137, 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
104Jd
1os Id
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to promulgate the standards. 106 The court agreed. 107 It held that the
EPA's "2004 decision not to promulgate national guidelines for the
construction industry . . . [was] at odds with the expressly stated
goals ofthe legislation." 108
National Resources Defense Council is not an isolated
example of the EPA's failure to publish rules according to the
expressly stated goals of Congress. On the contrary, examples of
the EPA's failure to promulgate rules according to nondiscretionary
provisions of the Clean Air Act abound. In the first four years after
the enactment of the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, the
EPA missed twenty-two of forty-two deadlines to publish rules. 109
In 2006, the United States Government Accountability Office
("GAO") found that "most of [the EPA's] regulatory actions were
completed late and major aspects ofthe program have still not been
addressed. no Specifically, the GAO found that only one of the four
categories of requirements had been published, resulting in 96 rules,
and these were completed four years late.m With regard to small
stationary sources, the EPA had published only sixteen of seventy
emissions standards. 112 Furthermore the GAO found that as of
2005, the EPA had not yet even estimated "the level of resources
necessary to comply with the remaining requirements of the 1990
amendments." 113 As a result ofthese failures, several suits pertaining
to the EPA's continuing failure to promulgate nondiscretionary rules

Id at 1157.
Id at 1160.
1os Id

106
107

109 U.S. Gov'T AccoUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/RCED-95-70, REPORT To CoNGREs
SIONAL REQUESTERS, CLEAN AIR RULEMAKING: TRACKING SYSTEM WoULD HELP MEA
SURE PRoGREss OF STREAMLINING INITIATIVES, 21 (1995) [hereinafter GAO RULE
MAKING REPORT] available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbatl/153932.pdf
" 0 U.S. Gov'T AccoUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-06-669, REPORT To CoNGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS, CLEAN AIR AcT: EPA SHOULD IMPRoVE THE MANAGEMENT oF ITs AIR
Toxrcs PROGRAM, (2006) [hereinafter GAO CAA REPORT], available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d06669 .pdf.
mId at 4.
ll2Jd
113

Id at 5.
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are pending. 114 Critical to the question of relief in the American
Electric decision, was the presumption that the Plaintiffs had an
avenue of relief through EPA regulatory efforts. 115 The Supreme
Court's reasoning contradicts the findings of the GAO, which
concluded: "As a result of the limited progress in implementing
these requirements, EPA has not reduced human health risks from air
toxics to the extent and in the time frames envisioned in the act." 116
Because of the EPA's systemic failures to publish nondiscretionary
rules, according to the provisions ofthe Clean Air Act, the Supreme
Court's decision in American Electric does not provide the plaintiffs
with practical redress to harm suffered.
2. Delays in Correction of EPA Failures to Publish

The Court rightly noted that plaintiffs have judicial recourse
in the event that the EPA fails to fulfill its statutory duties. 117 As the
Supreme Court noted, "States and private parties may petition for
a rulemaking on the matter, and EPA's response will be reviewable
in federal court." 118 In practice, however, judicial correction of
EPA failures along this path has been less than expeditious. In

114 In October, 2011, Earthjustice, on behalf of six plaintiffs, gave notice, pursu
ant to 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(2) and 40 C.F.R. Pt. 54, of intent to sue the EPA for
failure to promulgate rules for national ambient air quality standards as required
by the Clean Air Act. See EARTHWSTICE, NoTicE OF CITIZEN SuiT UNDER SECTION
304 oF THE CLEAN AIR AcT REGARDING FAILURE To PERFORM NoNDISCRETIONARY Du
TIES WITH RESPECT TO OzoNE NONATTAINMENT/ATTAINMENT DESIGNATIONS (Oct. 26,
2011 ), http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/NonattainmentNOI.pdf. See also
Complaint, WildEarth Guardians v. Jackson, No. 11 CV 5651 (N.D. Cal. filed
Nov. 22, 2011 ), http://www.trialinsider.com/pd£'ozone. pdf(plaintiffs alleging that
the "EPA has yet to follow through with two key nondiscretionary duties neces
sary to implement its 2008 Ozone NAAQS").
115 Am. Elec. Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2538.
116 See GAO RULEMAKING REPORT, supra note 109, at 15 (asserting, "EPA has made
little progress and is behind schedule in completing residual risk and technology
reviews and in issuing emissions standards for small stationary sources and mo
bile sources").
117 Am. Elec. Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2538.
118Jd.
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1990, Congress enacted sweeping changes to the Clean Air Act. 119
Included in these changes were requirements for the EPA to issue
standards for area sources and specific pollutants. 120 These area
sources were those in "which the Administrator [found] present a
threat of adverse effects to human health or the environment. " 121
Pollutants in the relevant sections included such chemicals as
mercury and alkylated lead compounds. 122 Within ten years of the
1990 amendments' enactment, the EPA was to have promulgated
rules concerning these areas' sources and pollutants. 123 In 2006, the
EPA's failure to publish rules as required by the 1990 amendments
prompted the Sierra Club to seek an injunction against the EPA
requiring publication of the rules. 124 In Sierra Club v. Johnson, the
court ordered the EPA to promulgate the standards as required in
the 1990 amendments, with respect to specific pollutants in § 112(c)
(6), no later than December 15,2007. 125 Between August 2006, and
January 2011, the EPA filed for, and received, several unopposed
extensions to the court's order in Sierra Club. 126 In January 2011, in
an opposed action, the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia granted what it termed a further "slight extension" to
the EPA's deadline. 127 As of October 13, 2011, the EPA continues to
defend what it terms a further"[ d]elay [n ]otice" in the promulgation
of the rules in question. 128 Twenty-one years after Congress enacted
the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, important provisions
concerning the control ofharmful pollutants remain unimplemented.
The delays exemplified by the Sierra Club cases above, have
already begun to accrue with regard to the May 2012 promulgations

See Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
Id § 112(c)(3), (5), 104 Stat. 2537-38.
121 Id § 112(c)(3), 104 Stat. 2537 (describing area sources).
122 Id § 112(c)(6), 104 Stat. 2538 (describing specific pollutants).
123 Id § 112(q)(l), 104 Stat. 2562.
124 See Sierra Club v. Johnson, 2011 WL 181097 (D.D.C. 2006).
125 Id at 61.
126 Sierra Club v. Jackson, 2011 WL 181097 (D.D.C. 2011).
127 Id at 14 (noting that the EPA had not "even attempted to show that a more
expeditious schedule would be impossible").
128 Sierra Club v. Jackson, 2011 WL 4852208 (D.D.C. 2011 ).
119

120
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anticipated by the Supreme Court in American Electric. 129 In June
2011, the EPA deferred until September 30, 2011 its obligation
to publish the proposed rule, initially due by July 26, 2011. This
would have been the precursor to the May 12, 2012 final rule.U 0 In
September, however, the EPA indefinitely postponed its issuing of
proposed New Source Performance Standards. 131
3. Complexity of the Greenhouse Gas, and Flawed
Endangerment Studies

The delays in the anticipated rules are due in part to the nature
of greenhouse-gas-as-pollutant analysis. Regulation of greenhouse
gases as produced by power plants represents a problem of unusual
depth and complexity for the EPA. 132 Even the EPA's own Inspector
General, on September 26, 2011, found serious flaws in the agency's
methodologies for its endangerment studies related to greenhouse
gases. 133 The flaws in the endangerment studies are critical to the
129 See Andrea Field, CoMMENTS oF THE UTILITY AIR REGULATORY GRoUP ON EPA's
PLAN To PRoPosE AND FINALIZE CLEAN AIR AcT SEcTioN 111 PERFORMANCE STAN
DARDS FOR ELECTRIC GENERATING UNITS, Docket ID: EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0090
at 2, available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ
OAR-2011-0090-2770 (arguing "it is not unheard of for the Agency to take three
to five years in which to conduct and complete proceedings to set section 111(b)
NSPS and section 111 (d) emission guidelines. It is, however, unheard of- and un
reasonable- for EPA to try to conduct such proceedings for a large and complex
source category in less than 18 months").
130 EPA, MODIFICATION TO GREENHOUSE GAS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (20 11)
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/carbonpollutionstandardlpdfs/O 110613
ghgsettlementmod. pdf.
131 See Columbia Law School, Climate Regulation Tracking Service, CENTER FOR
CLIMATE CHANGE http://www.law.columbia.edu/centers/climatechange/resources/
epa#Endangerment (last update Jan. 31, 2011 ).
132 See Field, supra note 18, at 2 (explaining that "[i]n particular, additional time
is needed because EPA has never before developed NSPS for greenhouse gas
emissions from any source category, and the issues that arise will thus be novel,
numerous, and complex").
133 U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, PROCEDURAL RE
VIEW oF EPA's GREENHOUSE GAsEs ENDANGERMENT FINDING DATA QuALITY PRocEss
Es, Report No. 11-P-0702, Sept. 26, 2011 at 22, 29 [hereinafter EPA Procedural
Review] available at atwww.epa.gov/oig/reports/20 11/2011 0926-11-P-0702.pdf.
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problem raised in American Electric, because endangerment studies
of greenhouse gases form the basis ofthe proposed and final rules. 134
These rules open the way to what the Supreme Court in American
Electric identified as proper avenues of relief for the plaintiffs in
that case. 135
Unfortunately, these greenhouse gas endangerment studies
have run into problems. In American Electric, the Supreme Court
recalled that its decision in Massachusetts v. EPA held that greenhouse
gases were pollutants within meaning of the Clean Air Act and
therefore "within the EPA's regulatory ken." 136 Because greenhouse
gases were held to be governed by the Clean Air Act, the Court
reasoned that the EPAAdministrator had been tasked under§ 111 of
the Act to list "categories of stationary sources" of greenhouse gases
that "in her judgment . . . cause, or contribute significantly to, air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare." 137 That is, the EPA had been tasked to perform
an endangerment study to determine whether the public's health or
welfare was sufficiently at risk, so as to justify the promulgation
of rules. In response to the Massachusetts decision, the EPA
conducted a study to determine whether the requisite endangerment
concerning greenhouse gases existed. 138 The agency concluded that
Am. Elec. Power, 131 S.Ct. at2537.
Id The Supreme Court noted two components to the relief. First, rulemaking:
"Once EPA lists a category, the agency must establish standards of performance
for emission of pollutants from new or modified sources within that category." Id
Second, enforcement, which may be delegated to the states, but which continues
to be monitored by the EPA. Id at 2538.
136 Id at 2533.
137 Id at 2537 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 74ll(b)(1)(A)) (emphasis added).
138 See Environmental Protection Agency, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute
Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) ofthe Clean Air Act, 75 Fed.
Reg. 66496, 66499 (Dec. 14, 2009). The EPA described the nature of its study as
follows: "In order to determine if emissions of the well-mixed greenhouse gases
from CAA section 202(a) source categories contribute to the air pollution that
endangers public health and welfare, the Administrator compared the emissions
from these CAA section 202(a) source categories to total global and total U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions, finding that these source categories are responsible for
about four percent of total global well-mixed greenhouse gas emissions and just
over 23 percent oftotal U.S. well-mixed greenhouse gas emissions." Id at 66499.
134

135
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section 202(a) source categories contributed significantly to global
concentrations of greenhouse gasses in such a way they "may be
reasonably be anticipated both to endanger public health and to
endanger public welfare." 139
The EPA's Inspector General found, however, the
endangerment studies regarding greenhouse gases suffered from
two critical flaws. First, the Inspector General found that the study's
use of highly influential scientific assessments in greenhouse gas
endangerment studies did not adequately employ the principles
of peer review. 140 The report also found that the EPA's assessment
procedures of external data in its endangerment studies were not
sufficiently clear. 141 The endangerment findings had already come
under fire by certain state authorities, challenging their accuracy and
applicability. 142 This report, by the EPA's own Inspector General,
will likely further exacerbate the EPA's inability to promulgate the
proposed rules anticipated by the Supreme Court in a timely manner.
4. Delay as a Practical Lack of Redressability

Because final rules published by the EPA are dependent
upon the publication of the proposed rules and subsequent public
comments, the final rule anticipated by the Supreme Court in
American Electric faces indefinite postponement as well. 143
Accordingly, the plaintiffs' avenue of relief, as promised by the
Court faces a delay of indeterminate length, if it is forthcoming
at all. Notably, the Supreme Court in American Electric actually
anticipated the possibility of the EPA failing to regulate greenhouse
gases at all, but assured that such failure "would not escape judicial
review." 144 Given the EPA's track record of delay and omission
Id at 66497, 66499.
See EPA Procedural Review, supra note 133, at 13.
141 Id at26.
142 Coalitionfor Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. E.P.A., No. 09-1322, 2010 WL
5509187 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 10, 2010). Petitioners included the States of Texas and
Virginia and a variety of private concerns.
143 For a useful table describing the progress of rules promulgation, see GAO
RULEMAKING REPORT, supra note 109, at 16.
144 Am. Elec. Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2539.
139

140
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on matters like the one in American Electric however, the Court's
assurance does not engender optimism.
The maxim "justice delayed is justice denied," is well
known. 145 As Chief Justice Warren Burger has stated,
A sense of confidence in the courts is essential to
maintain the fabric ofordered liberty for a free people
and three things could destroy that confidence and do
incalculable damage to society: that people come to
believe that inefficiency and delay will drain even a
just judgment of its value; that people who have long
been exploited in the smaller transactions of daily
life come to believe that courts cannot vindicate their
legal rights from fraud and over-reaching; that people
come to believe the law- in the larger sense - cannot
fulfill its primary function to protect them and their
families in their homes, at their work, and on the
public streets. 146
Burger's admonishment is directly on point with respect
to the Court's decision in American Electric. Until that decision,
states and their citizens, suffering harm from pollution at the hands
of other states or their citizens have had two possible avenues of
redress: where the EPA had actually promulgated final rules, the
rules themselves and their enforcement provided relief. 147 In those
areas for which the EPA had not yet promulgated final rules, the
federal common law ofnuisance ably filled the gap, and ensured that
a quasi-sovereign state would have "the last word as to whether its
mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall
breathe pure air." 148

145 Carrie E. Johnson, Rocket Dockets: Reducing Delay In Federal Civil Litiga
tion, 85 CAL. L. REv. 225, 230 (1997).
146 Warren E. Burger, What:S Wrong With the Courts: The Chief Justice Speaks
Out, 69 U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPORT 68, 71 (Aug. 24, 1970) (address to ABA
meeting, Aug. 10, 1970).
147 See supra notes 30--46 and accompanying text.
148 Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237.
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But now, with the decision in American Electric, a state
or its citizens who suffer harm from a type of air pollution not
yet regulated must wait for the EPA to regulate the pollution. If
"the field has been occupied," institutional delays to establishing
complex regulations must be tolerated. 149 The dissent in Milwaukee
II expressed frustration at a similar effect to the majority's decision
there. As Justice Blackman wrote, "Nine years ago, in Illinois v.
Milwaukee, this Court unanimously determined that Illinois could
bring a federal common-law action against the city of Milwaukee,
three other Wisconsin cities, and two sewerage commissions ...
[t]oday, the Court decides that this [nine]-year judicial exercise has
been just a meaningless charade." 150 As a result of the decision in
American Electric, it is arguable that this eight-year judicial exercise
will also ultimately end up a "meaningless charade." The Supreme
Court's ruling is final, the EPA has yet to regulate greenhouse
gasses, it's study methodologies have been found flawed by its own
Inspector General, and the plaintiffs continue to suffer at the hands of
the five largest American producers of carbon dioxide. Such are the
consequences of relying on anticipatory delegation as a theory for
redress. Given the EPA's omissions, delays, and flawed studies, the
prospective relief promised by the Supreme Court seems a practical
fiction that will do little to secure abatement by the Defendants. 151
B. The Paradox ofAnticipatory Delegation and Standing

The American Electric Court only briefly touched on the
question of the plaintiff's standing in its decision. 152 The Court's
brevity, however, did not conceal the deep divide over the question.
The Court split four-four on the issue, and in so doing, affirmed

149
15

Am. Elec. Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2538.

°City ofMilwaukee, 451 U.S. at 332-33.

151 See Guardians Ass 'n v. Civil Serv. Comm 'n ofCity ofNew York, 463 U.S. 582,
627 (1983) (Marshall, dissenting) (Justice Marshall reasoning that "[r]estricting
relief to prospective remedies can only encourage recipients acting in bad faith
to make no effort to comply with the statute and to stall private litigants in the
knowledge that justice delayed will be justice denied").
152 Am. Elec. Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2535.
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the decision of the Second Circuit. 153 Justice Ginsburg, writing
for the Court, explained that the split in the American Electric
decision reflected the Court's division in Massachusetts v. EPA. 154
Four justices in American Electric agreed that under the rule of
Massachusetts, the plaintiffs had Article III standing. 155 Four of the
justices, subscribing to the dissent in Massachusetts, held that they
did not. 156 The practical lack of redressibility, as discussed in the
previous section, has implications for both sides on the standing
issue and raises certain paradoxical problems. These paradoxes
further illuminate flaws in the Court's newly minted doctrine of
anticipatory delegation.
1. The Pro-Massachusetts Majority Faction
Paradoxically Undermines Standing

The majority in Massachusetts v. EPA held that the plaintiffs
had Article III standing. 157 In American Electric, those justices who
followed the majority holding in Massachusetts were also in the
majority in Massachusetts, now including Kagan, J. 158 These four
justices, in following the majority decision in Massachusetts, held
that the Plaintiffs in American Electric also had Article III standing.
Redressability remains one of the three well-entrenched
core requirements for standing. 159 But even though the difficulties in
Id
154Jd
155 Id
156 Id
157 Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. at 526. The Second Circuit Court ofAppeals
in its decision in American Electric, based its justification for granting plaintiffs
standing, in large part, on the holding of Massachusetts. See Am. Elec. Power,
582 F.3d at 349 (holding that the Massachusetts holding with regard to remedies
"undercuts Defendants' position that a reduction in their emissions will not have
an impact on Plaintiffs' injuries because global warming will continue due to
emissions by other parties. As the States rightly assert: 'Even if emissions in
crease elsewhere, the magnitude of Plaintiffs' injuries will be less if Defendants'
emissions are reduced than they would be without a remedy"').
158 E.g., Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, JJ. and Sotomayer, J. took no part in the
case. See Am. Elec. Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2531.
159 See Cassandra Stubbs, Is the Environmental Citizen Suit Dead? An Exam ina153
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redressibility bore directly on the question of standing, the Court in
American Electric did not explicitly correlate the two in its decision. 160
The Court was silent regarding difficulties the EPA might have in
addressing the problem of greenhouse gases. 161 Instead, the Court
waxed on about the various ways in which the Clean Air Act, and
the EPA's regulation of it was the best possible scenario for relief. 162
Herein lies one weakness of the Court's decision, and the paradox
of the pro-Massachusetts majority faction in American Electric.
The pro-Massachusetts majority faction held that the plaintiffs in
American Electric had standing. But the Court also held that the
EPA's regulation displaced the federal common law of nuisance. 163
Had the EPA actually begun to promulgate greenhouse gas-related
rules, the Court's rationale might have been warranted, because
there would have been the possibility of practical relief. 164 The steps
outlined by the Court would reflect, at least roughly, the process
through which harm might ultimately be redressed, and which
would be required for standing. 165 But at the time of the decision,
no such rules had been published, and due to EPA delays since that
time, substantial obstacles to the rules' creation remain.

tion ofthe Erosion ofStandards ofJusticiability for Environmental Citizen Suits,
26 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 77, 97 (2000-2001).
160 Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2535. But see Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 52526 (holding that the relief plaintiffs sought would reduce the risk of catastrophic
harm due to global warming "to some extent," thereby concluding the require
ment of redressability had been met). Arguably, the Court in American Electric
incorporated this rationale by way of reference. See Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct.
at 2535.
161 Am. Elec. Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2537-39.
162 Id. at 2539--40 (noting the availability of judicial review of EPA action or in
action, the expert nature of the EPA, the extensive cooperation between federal
and state authorities, and the comparative inability of the judiciary to make suf
ficiently informed decisions).
163 I d. at 2537.
164 See Stubbs, supra note 159, at 111 (noting that "[i]f redressability is no longer
tethered to the likelihood of addressing the plaintiff's specific harm alleged, re
dressability becomes another completely subjective inquiry by the court").
165 Id. at 111-12 (stating that a proper redressability inquiry turns on whether the
court considers the form of redress valuable).
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Indeed, given the recent trajectory of environmental law,
the Court's confidence that the EPA will be able to provide redress
seems overly optimistic. 166 The difficulty in environmental claims
to assert redressability for standing purposes has grown. As Holly
Doremus has written, "The most difficult issue for environmental
litigants may be redressability: while it is becoming ever easier to
show that climate change causes concrete and imminent injury, it is
ever more difficult to show that any judicial remedy could solve the
problem." 167 As an example, Matthew Miller computed an estimated
annual global percentage of actual greenhouse emission reductions
that would have resulted had the Plaintiffs received the judicial relief
they sought in American Electric. 168 Miller found that even with a
large judicially imposed reduction of 15% upon the Defendants in
American Electric, the greenhouse gas curbs would have resulted in,
at best, a 0.2% reduction in global greenhouse gases- an amount
that would decrease after the first year. 169
Miller argues that such small percentages do not satisfy
the demand for redressability. 170 Others, on the other hand, argue
that redressibility jurisprudence is evolving to accommodate
the new challenges of emerging environmental complaints. One
such commentator, Andrew Long, has stated that the decision
in Massachusetts "reconceptualize[d] environmental standing
to recognize the difficulty, perhaps impossibility, of employing a
private law framework . . . when deciding a challenge to agency
action impacting complex natural systems." 171

166 See Matthew Edwin Miller, The Right Issue, the Wrong Branch: Arguments
Against Adjudicating Climate Change Nuisance Claims, 109 MicH. L. REv. 257,
280 (2010) (contending that all "public nuisance suits seeking emissions caps
should be dismissed for lack of redressability").
167 Holly Doremus, The Persistent Problem ofStanding in Environmental Law, 40
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,956, 10,957 (2010).
168 See Miller, supra note 166, at 282-84.
169 See id at 284.
170 Id (observing that "[i]t is unprecedented in public nuisance litigation to enter
tain a claim that sues for equitable relief from less than 0.2% of the nuisance").
171 Andrew Long, Standing & Consensus: Globalism In Massachusetts v. EPA, 23
J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 73, 111 (2008).
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Long is suggesting that the doctrine of environmental
redressability evolved in the Massachusetts decision. 172 In
Massachusetts, the majority held that the state had been harmed
by rising sea levels due to global warming. 173 That harm, the
Court predicted, would continue. 174 Even though EPA regulation
of greenhouse gases might represent a small increment of
improvement, the Court reasoned that it would be an improvement
nonetheless. 175 Because the risk of harm would be reduced to some
extent ifpetitioners received the reliefthey sought, the majority held
that petitioners had standing. 176 Long, in reflecting on that decision,
argues that the Massachusetts Court, faced with new complex
challenges in environmental litigation adopted what he termed
"the systemic ecological model of standing." 177 According to that
model, the Court "accepts that changes to one input of a system may
have real, if diffuse, effects on the system as a whole." 178 Long says
those changes, though diffuse, constitute sufficient redress so as to
establish standing. 179
Long's suggested evolution in the doctrine of standing made
sense in Massachusetts, where Plaintiffs sought review of an EPA
decision to refrain from regulating greenhouse gases under the Clean
Air Act. 180 There, the Court considered a change to an actual EPA

Id at 112.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 526.
174 Id at 526.
175 Id at 524 (noting that often regulation of problems takes place in slow, in
cremental steps: "EPA overstates its case. Its argument rests on the erroneous
assumption that a small incremental step, because it is incremental, can never be
attacked in a federal judicial forum").
176 Id at 526.
177 Long, supra note 171, at 112.
178 Id at 112.
179 Id at 112 (speculating that the systemic ecological model will "provide circum
stances where judicial review will be real, meaningful, and appropriately focused
on a critical legal question"). But see Miller, supra note 167, at 282 (arguing that
finding redressibility in climate nuisance suits "would render the redressability
requirement semantically hollow and practically meaningless, since plaintiffs can
gain only nominal relief from the climate harms at hand").
180 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 505.
172

173
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ruling. 181 That prospective change, if ordered, would have a "real,
if diffuse" effect on the system as a whole. 182 Accordingly, standing
would be warranted, at least with respect to redressibility.
Jonathan Z. Cannon has summarized a chain ofcausality and
redress that captures the logic in the Massachusetts decision:
Justice Stevens fashions an extended chain of
causation, which looks something like the following:
Domestic motor vehicles emit greenhouse gases.
Increased world greenhouse gas emissions have led
to a heightened greenhouse effect, which has led
to a global temperature rise, which has led to sea
level rise, which has led to loss of Massachusetts'
coastline. EPA's failure to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from automobiles contributes to this loss.
A correction of that failure will moderate the loss.
Hence injury, causation, and redressability were all
satisfied. 183
It is no matter than the effects are proportionally slight,
perhaps almost imperceptible. What matters is that every link in
the chain is demonstrable, with a basis in fact. On the other hand
the chain contemplated in American Electric was speculative, at
least at the point of the EPA's involvement. 184 Rules had not yet
been promulgated. 185 No similar chain of causation could be made
complete because the EPA's future action was largely contingent.
The Court in American Electric said that this did not matter.
Relying on Milwaukee II, the Court asserted: "the relevant question
for purposes ofdisplacement is 'whether the field has been occupied,
not whether it has been occupied in a particular manner. "' 186 This use
Id at 527-28.
See Long, supra note 171, at 112.
183 See Jonathan Z. Cannon, The Significance ofMassachusetts v. EPA, 93 VA. L.
REv. IN BRIEF 53, 57 (2007).
184 See Am.Elec. Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2538.
185 Id
186 Id at 2537-39 (citing City ofMilwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S. at
324).
181

182
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of the rule from Milwaukee II, however, overstates the rule as used
by the Milwaukee II Court. In that case, the plaintiffs argued that
recourse to the federal common law of nuisance was appropriate
because the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
did not adequately regulate effluent limitations on overflows. 187
The Court disagreed, because it deemed the effluent limitations
desired by the plaintiffs to be "site specific." 188 In that context, the
Milwaukee II Court concluded, "[d]emanding specific regulations of
general applicability before concluding that Congress has addressed
the problem to the exclusion of federal common law asks the wrong
question. "The question is whether the field has been occupied, not
whether it has been occupied in a particular manner." 189
The "occupation of the field" principle, as used by the Court
in Milwaukee II did not envision the kind of broad application
embraced by the Court in American Electric. It was not intended
to be an excuse through which the Court might avoid altogether
the three-part test for Article III standing. 190 Neither site-specific
requirements, nor specific regulations of general applicability were
at issue in American Electric, but an overarching scheme to control
greenhouse gases as they contributed to global warming. 191 In this
way, the field had not been occupied, at least not in the original
Milwaukee II sense. 192 Nor, was there any real prospect that the field
would be occupied in the near future.

City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S. at 323.
Id at 324.
189 Id
190 See Cannon, supra note 183, at 57 (noting that standing requires that relief be
capable of redressing the harm resulting from the legal violation complained of).
191 American Electric Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2534 (explaining that "all plaintiffs
sought injunctive relief requiring each defendant "to cap its carbon dioxide emis
sions and then reduce them by a specified percentage each year for at least a
decade").
192 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals understood Milwaukee II in this sense,
noting that the new federal legislation had "occupied the field through the estab
lishment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert admin
istrative agency," in which "[e]very point source discharge is prohibited unless
covered by a permit." American Electric, 582 F.3d at 373.
187
188

2011-2012]

EROSION OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW

373

In Lujan, upon which the majority in Massachusetts relied,
the Court wrote, "it is entirely conjectural whether the nonagency
activity that affects respondents will be altered or affected by the
agency activity they seek to achieve. There is no standing." 193 The
same uncertainty results from American Electric as a result of the
Court's new anticipatory delegation doctrine. Because the EPA's
regulation was speculative, any relief resulting from regulation
would be conjectural. Anticipatory delegation casts doubt on
whether relief is actually available; it also therefore casts doubt on
plaintiffs' claim of standing. Had the plaintiffs in American Electric
been allowed to pursue their claim under the federal common law of
nuisance, there might have been some possibility of redress. But the
Court's doctrine of anticipatory delegation precluded that, because
the EPA's contingent action was, and is, largely in doubt. In this
way, and paradoxically so, the pro-Massachusetts-majority faction
in American Electric, which affirmed standing, undermined its own
holding that standing exists. By preempting the federal common law,
the faction delegated reliefto an agency in no position to provide it.
That anticipatory delegation yields this contradictory result, further
reduces its usefulness.
2. The Pro-Massachusetts Dissent Paradoxically Affirms
Standing

A similar paradox results when anticipatory delegation
is applied to the holding of those justices in American Electric
who sided with the dissent in Massachusetts v. EPA on the issue
of standing. There is no characterization of the specific points of
disagreement that split the American Electric Court on the question
-only that the Court followed the lines ofthe majority and dissent
opinions in Massachusetts. 194 The same four justices opposing
standing in Massachusetts also opposed it in American Electric. 195
The dissent in Massachusetts groaned over what it termed as the
majority's "tenuous link between petitioners' alleged injury and the
Lujan v. Defenders ofWildlife, 504 U.S. at 571.
American Electric Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2535.
195 E.g., Roberts, CJ, Scalia, Thomas, andAlito, JJ.
193

194
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indeterminate fractional domestic emissions at issue ... " 196 Chief
Justice Roberts reasoned that contributions from other global sources
of greenhouse gases further clouded the question of redressibility. 197
Because these other external sources of greenhouse gas emissions
were not before the Court, any redress as envisioned by the majority
was, according to the Chief Justice, "pure conjecture." 198 The
dissent also dismissed the "special solicitude" provision to which
the majority said the State of Massachusetts was entitled, in virtue
of its particular status as a state. 199 Chief Justice Roberts criticized
the "special solicitude" provision for being unclear with regard
to application. 200 Instead, the dissent claimed that Massachusetts
had not met the requirement for standing, particularly because
its arguments regarding redressibility were too attenuated. 201 The
dissent dryly observed: "No matter, the Court reasons, because
any decrease in domestic emissions will 'slow the pace of global
emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere.' Every little
bit helps, so Massachusetts can sue over any little bit."202 The pro
Massachusetts-dissent faction's standing interpretation reflected a
more traditional understanding, such as that expressed in Lujan,
with no small degree of skepticism where generalized grievances
are the basis of a complaint. 203
Under the newly minted doctrine of anticipatory delegation,
however, the American Electric Court's solution for relief is
Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. at 545.
Id
198 Id at 546. Chief Justice Roberts explained that, "when an the existence of an
element of standing 'depends on the unfettered choices made by independent ac
tors not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion
the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict,' a party must present
facts supporting an assertion that the actor will proceed in such a manner." (citing
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 545--46). In other words, to prevail on
the question of standing, the plaintiffs had to offer evidence that other indepen
dent actors affecting greenhouse gas levels, such as large countries, would behave
in predictable ways.
199 Id at 540.
2oo Id
201 Id at 542.
202 Id at 546.
203 Lujan v. Defenders ofWildlife, 504 U.S. at 560-561.
196
197
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strikingly similar to the relief the dissent opposed in Massachusetts
as insufficient to establish standing. To begin with, even though
the dissent argued that there was no standing in Massachusetts,
also stating that the Plaintiffs in American Electric did not have
standing, it still calls the proposed regulation of greenhouse gases,
"the same relief the plaintiffs seek ... " 204 On its face, that seems
not only an acknowledgement of redressibility, which the dissent
in Massachusetts contested, but also a provision of specific relief to
redress harm. To describe the proposed EPA regulation ofgreenhouse
gases as "relief' implies redressability, and thereby undermines the
faction's contention that Plaintiffs have no standing.
Beyond this problem, however, the pro-Massachusetts
dissent faction is beset by paradoxes arising from its support of the
doctrine of anticipatory delegation. The dissent's charge that the
majority had engaged in "pure conjecture" in its standing analysis205
might be leveled against the dissent itself. At first blush, the regulatory
process, as outlined by the Court, ostensibly accomplishes the goal
of redress. The EPA Administrator is to list categories of stationary
sources, the emissions of which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare. 206 Following this, the agency must
list standards of performance from new sources. 207 The agency then
regulates existing sources, issues guidelines, and pursues avenues
of enforcement at the state and federallevei.2° 8 Should the EPA fail
to make rules as required, states and private parties may petition for
rulemaking in federal court. 209 On the whole, the regulatory scheme
appears sound. But as noted, EPA's actual regulation of greenhouse
gases is significantly delayed, if on track at all. 210 Not only has
the EPA Administrator not listed categories of stationary sources
reasonably anticipated to endanger public health or welfare, but the
studies and proposed rules upon which those categories are based
American Electric Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2538 (emphasis added).
Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. at 542.
206 American Electric Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2537.
201 Id
208 Id at 2537-38.
209 Id at 2538.
210 See supra notes 109-116, and accompanying text.
204
205
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have also been delayed indefinitely. 211 Given the current lack of
progress by the EPA, effective relief of the plaintiffs' injury seems
at this state to be "pure conjecture".
In Massachusetts, the dissent criticized the majority for
justifying its redressability requirement for standing by considering
"every little bit," or objectionably small increments. 212 " Given the
pace at which EPA regulation is unfolding, however, it is hard to see
how the Court in American Electric is not subject to the same charge.
Because anticipatory delegation preempts the federal common law,
the EPA must be the avenue ofrelief. 213 Because ofthe EPA's delays,
progress toward relief for the Plaintiffs in American Electric is
nearly imperceptible, if not stalled altogether. 214 The causal chain
endorsed by the majority in Massachusetts is of a different kind than
the series of steps that must be taken by the EPA in the agency's
regulation of greenhouse gases. The first link in EPA's regulation
of greenhouse gases still has not occurred. But both causal chains
are processes, gradually implemented, that are intended to bring the
Plaintiffs relief.
In the same way, the dissent in Massachusetts criticized the
majority for using sleight ofhand to link up the three elements ofthe
standing test. 215 "What must be likely to be redressed is the particular
injury in fact." 216 But through its use of anticipatory delegation,
the Massachusetts dissent and its American Electric counterpart,
arguably perform the same sleight of hand trick. The faction's
criticism was that the connection between the harm suffered and the
relief sought by plaintiffs in Massachusetts was too attenuated. 217 The
same may be said ofthe American Electric Court's promised relief
in view of anticipatory delegation. Because anticipatory delegation
preempts federal common law, redress is available only through the
interminably faltering EPA. Progress toward relief, under American
See supra, note 109.
Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. at 546.
213 American Electric Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2538.
214 See supra notes 109-116, and accompanying text.
21s Id
216 Id
217 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 546.
211

212
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Electric, is therefore both slow and uncertain, so as to call the link
between the harm suffered and the relief attained tenuous at best.
In summary, even though the Pro-Massachusetts
dissent faction is opposed to the majority's theory of standing in
Massachusetts, the faction's own plan for relief in American Electric
is subject to virtually all the same criticism. Ironically, this paradox
is mainly as a consequence of the Court's adoption of anticipatory
delegation. By thrusting the agency into the center of the problem,
the Court has prevented the plaintiffs from considering other, more
efficient and effective options. The American Electric Court does not
study the EPA's efficiency, or the manner in which it has historically
promulgated rules. The plaintiffs are told, in essence, "Sit tight.
Don't worry about relief. We'll get around to it."
The paradoxes that plague both sides of the division on
standing suggest that something is wrong with the Court's use of
anticipatory delegation as a means to displace federal common law.
For justices who support the Massachusetts majority, anticipatory
delegation undermines the majority's holding that standing exists.
For justices supporting the Massachusetts dissent, anticipatory
delegation subjects the Court's holding in American Electric to the
same scrutiny applied by the dissent in Massachusetts. The best
way forward is to jettison anticipatory delegation, and return to
the rule as articulated in Massachusetts. That rule, as the Second
Circuit stated it, proscribes preemption where the Clean Air Act
has not "thoroughly addressed" the problem of greenhouse gases
through EPA regulation. 218 Absent anticipatory delegation, plaintiffs
in American Power raise a justiciable federal common law nuisance
claim that would be remanded to the District Court. 219 There the
court might consider both a caps and curbs on greenhouse emissions,
providing relief to the plaintiffs, however small.

American Electric Power, 582 F.3d at 381.
This is in fact what the Second Circuit did. See id. at 392-93 (explaining, "[i]
t may happen that new federal laws and new federal regulations may in time pre
empt the field of federal common law of nuisance. But until that comes to pass,
federal courts will be empowered to appraise the equities of the suits alleging
creation of a public nuisance" by greenhouse gases").
218

219
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III. IMPLICATIONS
A. Implications for the Plaintiffs in American Electric
1. Anticipatory Delegation Not Likely to Be Overturned
The dark underside ofAmerican Electric is that the multitude
of plaintiffs - eight states, two conservation groups, and the City of
New York- continue to suffer harm at the hands of the five largest
American producers ofgreenhouse gases, while the Plaintiffs wait for
the EPA to get its house in order on greenhouse gasses. 220 Meanwhile,
the harm from greenhouse gases goes largely unabated. 221 Given the
Court's present disposition on the displacement of federal common
law, and because the EPA is stalled in publishing proposed rules,
it is not likely that the Plaintiffs will experience any relief for the
foreseeable future. In any event, the Court indicated that it is inclined
toward displacement. The Court in American Electric was clear:
"for it is primarily the office of Congress, not the federal courts, to
prescribe national policy in areas of special federal interest."222 In
this way, the doctrine of anticipatory delegation is not likely to be
overturned.

2. Procedures for Plaintiffs in American Electric
If and when the EPA actually promulgates rules governing
stationary source emissions of greenhouse gases, the American
Electric plaintiffs will need to be prepared to hold the EPA's feet to
the fire. The Court in American Electric identified four specific ways
in which plaintiffs might speed the EPA's hand. 223 First, plaintiffs
American Electric Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2533-34.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 521-522 (citing climate scientist Michael
MacCracken who warns that there is a "strong consensus" among climate scien
tists that global warming threatens a rise in sea levels, "severe and irreversible
changes to natural ecosystems," "significant reduction in water storage in winter
snowpack," "an increase in the spread of disease," and "an increase in the ferocity
of hurricanes").
222 American Electric Power, 131 S.Ct. at 2537.
223 !d. at 2538.
220
221
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will have an opportunity to petition the EPA for a rulemak:ing. 224
Should the EPA choose not to perform the rulemaking, that decision
is reviewable in federal court. 225 Once the EPA does publish rules,
they will initially be released as a set ofproposed rules. The plaintiffs
will have an opportunity to comment with the rest of the public on
those rules. 226 Once final rules are published, the EPA monitors
enforcement of the rule. 227 Because the Court in American Electric
displaced federal common law through anticipatory delegation, the
plaintiffs in American Electric must be prepared to litigate through
the EPA's rulemak:ing processes.
B. Implications for Similarly Situated Cases
1. Anticipatory Delegation Severely Curtails the Role of
Federal Common Law in Environmental Complaints

American Electric is the new bellwether for federal common
law preemption, at least in the area of environmental law. Under
the rule in American Electric, an agency need not have regulated
an area for there to have been preemption of the federal common
law. 228 As long as a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme has
delegated the field to the agency, federal common law is preempted
with regard to the entire field. 229 In American Electric, the Supreme
Court again emphasized that "When Congress addresses a question
previously governed by a decision rested on federal common
law . . . the need for such an unusual exercise of law-making
by federal courts disappears . . . for it is primarily the office of
Congress, not the federal courts, to prescribe national policy in areas
of special federal interest."230 In other words, the federal common
law serves as a stopgap. Once the political branches have exercised
224Jd
225 Id
226 Id
227 Id
22s Id
229 Id
230 Id

at 2539.
at 2533.
at 2538.

at 2537 (citing Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 314).
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their considerable investigative muscle, and applied the resulting
research to enact national policy, it is the role of the Court to recede
and allow the work of the political branches to proceed.
The problem, of course, will arise anytime there is a
substantive delay between the time an injury is suffered and the time
when the area in which the injury occurred is regulated by an agency.
In some cases, the delay may be lengthy, since the injury may occur
in an area that the agency does not presently regulate. In that case,
the agency may be put on notice by the judiciary that it must regulate,
in which case the administrative processes of regulation begins. But
for prospective plaintiffs after American Electric, it should be noted
that even though there may be substantial delay, if the agency is
determined to have occupied the field, the plaintiff likely would not
have recourse until the agency begins its regulation.
2. Anticipatory Delegation Does Not Make Preemption
Fait Accompli

The holding in American Electric, though it further
impedes on the territory of federal common law, does not doom
every environmental complaint by the doctrine of anticipatory
delegation. The Court made clear that the key question with regard
to displacement is "whether the field has been occupied."231
Several commentators have noted that while regulatory
preemption of federal common law is sometimes appropriate, a
complete abrogation ofthe common law through regulatory schemes
leaves open certain gaps, which the common law once ably filled. 232
Robert L. Glicksman, gives the following example:
Suppose, for example, that Milwaukee is complying
with all federally issued effluent limitations as well as
any additional limitations issued by Wisconsin. The
Clean Water Act may provide no basis for Illinois
to seek an abatement of Milwaukee's discharges
through the application of Illinois' more stringent
Id at 2538.
See Glicksman, supra note 29, at 166--67 (holding forth gaps in the Clean Water
Act as an example of those which federal common law fills).
231

232
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effluent limitations, even if those discharges are
causing harm to Illinois residents or resources. The
preemption of federal common-law remedies may
leave Illinois unable to protect its "right to be free
from unreasonable interference with its natural
environment and resources when the interference
stems from another State or its citizens."233
According to Glicksman, because there is a hole in coverage
in the Clean Water Act, unless there is opportunity for relief under
the federal common law of nuisance, Illinois may have no avenue of
redress for the harm it has suffered. 234
Another example concerns the question of nonpoint source
pollution and its contribution to what is called the "Dead Zone" in
the Gulf of Mexico. 235 Endre Szalay explains that the Dead Zone
is a large area off the coasts of Louisiana and Texas in the Gulf
of Mexico. 236 Because of nutrient rich runoff flowing out of the
Mississippi River basin, this area of the Gulf is seasonally depleted
of oxygen, such that almost no aquatic life is able to survive. 237 The
main sources of the oxygen-depleting nutrients (phosphorous and
nitrogen) are fertilizers used in farms along the river basin. 238 Szalay
explains that the Clean Water Act has not addressed this form of
pollution since the Clean Water Act's primary target of regulatory
control is point source pollution. 239
Glicksman, supra note 29, at 166.
Id. at 167 (suggesting that "a state's resort to federal common-law remedies
against an out-of-state polluter may very well promote the accommodation of
conflicting state interests by providing a federal rule and forum to resolve the
dispute").
235 See Endre Szalay, Breathing Life Into The Dead Zone: Can The Federal Com
mon Law OfNuisance Be Used To Control Nonpoint Source Water Pollution? 85
TUL. L. REv. 215, 216 (2010).
236 I d.
237 Id. at 217. The seasonal oxygen depletion to area fisheries and shrimp fisher
men costs the United States Economy in excess of fifty million dollars per year.
I d. at 220.
238 I d.
239 Id. (explaining that point source pollution is that which is "directly conveyed
into the receiving water body through a pipe").
233

234
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In anticipation of the Supreme Court decision in American
Electric, Szalay considered the Second Circuit's decision for the
same case and reasoned that if the Second Circuit's holding were
applied to the problem of nonpoint sources, the federal common law
of nuisance should be applicable. 240 But the Supreme Court's use of
anticipatory delegation in American Electric casts some doubt on
Szalay's conclusion. The nonpoint sources are distinguishable from
the regulations in American Electric, since the EPA had expressly
entered into an agreement to regulate greenhouse gases. Whether
that distinction is enough to claim that the EPA has not occupied
the field remains to be seen. But that ultimately will be the question.
3. The Question of Standing for Environmental
Complaints is Still Hotly Contested

The split in American Electric on the question of standing
reveals that the deep division on the justiciability of environmental
claims remains changed since Massachusetts v. EPA. Jonathan
Cannon observes that the decision in Massachusetts represented
an "enormous, if narrow, victory for environmentalists."241 Cannon
goes on to argue that the change in the Supreme Court runs deeply:
"The Court has accepted - indeed has seemed to internalize - the
beliefs, assumptions, and values that animate the environmentalists'
views on climate change."242 The dissent on the other hand, according
to Cannon, "claims that the Court has exceeded its institutional
bounds and stepped into a policy role for which it is unsuited." 243
The Supreme Court's adoption without comment in American
Electric of its rationale in Massachusetts on standing suggests that
each side remains firmly entrenched in their respective positions.
That there was absolutely no discussion of the question, fully four
years after the sharp debate in Massachusetts, does not bode well for
the possibility of a clearly framed doctrine. Where communication
breaks down, there can be no meeting of the minds, no consensus.
Id at 245-246 (reasoning that the Clean Water Act fails to regulate nonpoint
source pollution).
241 See Cannon, supra note 183, at 53.
242 Id at 61.
243 Id at 62.
240
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CONCLUSION
The decision in American Electric is the latest encroachment
on the ever-shrinking territory of the federal common law. Whether
that encroachment is desirable depends on the degree to which
judicial remedies are preferable to those crafted by the executive,
the legislature or their agencies.
The problem in American Electric is anticipatory delegation.
The Court, in holding that the EPA had occupied the field with regard
to greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources deprived the
Plaintiffs ofthe opportunity to seek redress for their injuries. Exactly
when relief can ever be expected for the state plaintiffs is anyone's
guess. Anticipatory delegation yields results, which if taken with
the holding are paradoxical. It is paradoxical to hold that Plaintiffs
have standing, and in the end provide no practical means of redress
for harm suffered. It is also paradoxical to hold that plaintiffs have
no standing on the basis of lack of redressibility, and yet embrace a
form of relief that mirrors the relief sought by plaintiffs in important
ways.
Holly Doremus was correct when she wrote, "Perhaps, the
clearest lesson ... is that the law of environmental standing remains
exquisitely murky. It will surely continue to bedevil litigants, law
students, and judges for years to come."244

244

See Doremus, supra note 167, at 3.

